Alice Huang pitched Nvidia chip access for Southeast Asian project, report says

Megaspeed’s balance sheet grew from $33 million to $3 billion during 2024, much of it based on dealings involving subsidiaries, the report said. That is not a measure of revenue or an equivalent amount of outside investment. The reporting did not specify the loan amount.

The reporting describes Alibaba as both a customer and, through subsidiaries, a creditor of Megaspeed. It does not establish that Alibaba financed the particular project pitched in early 2025. Alibaba did not immediately respond to the report’s request for comment.

Access to Nvidia hardware alone would not distinguish the proposal from other cloud offerings. In its February 2025 results announcement, Nvidia said cloud providers including AWS, CoreWeave and Microsoft Azure were bringing its GB200 computing systems to cloud regions worldwide. The pitch report supplies no processor allocation, lease prices or operating costs with which to compare the proposed project’s economics.

Megaspeed’s own infrastructure also warrants scrutiny. A November 6 report said its Malaysian data centre landlord terminated its contract in April and reassigned 68.4 megawatts of capacity to another cloud provider. That report does not connect the terminated contract to the project pitched by Huang and Kang.

These reported responses concern distinct issues and do not establish espionage or unlawful chip transfers. Dates are presented in chronological order. Source: TheEnergyMag.

The separate inquiries into espionage and chip transfers

Alice Huang’s investment background predates the proposal. Hexi was established in 2010; Chinese corporate filings cited in the account of her business record show that it stopped updating annual results in 2022 and several fund products were subsequently wound up. The original investment report cited corporate records for Kang’s bank directorship. Neither he nor Alice Huang could be reached for comment.

The espionage allegation rests on an account of a US government memo, rather than a publicly disclosed finding. People familiar with the document said it drew on US intelligence and described a romantic relationship between Jensen Huang and Alice Huang, whom US intelligence believed had been recruited by China’s Ministry of State Security, its intelligence agency. The original report said it could not independently verify the espionage allegation. China’s Foreign Ministry rejected it on November 9 as groundless.

Jensen Huang acknowledged infidelity in a November 8 message to Nvidia employees, but did not identify the other person, according to an account of the company’s response. Nvidia said independent directors assisted by outside counsel would oversee an inquiry. Its board expressed confidence in his leadership and said it had no reason to believe national security or company secrets had been compromised.

Megaspeed separately faces investigations in multiple jurisdictions over alleged chip smuggling and strongly denies illicit activity. The company says inspections by US and Malaysian authorities and Nvidia found no evidence of violations, according to the account of its response. This remains the company’s account of those inspections. The November 6 report also quoted Jensen Huang saying Nvidia had examined Megaspeed’s GPU deployments and counted every processor.

Singapore said on October 31 that investigations into Megaspeed were ongoing, while denying it had investigated Alice Huang over alleged Chinese intelligence ties, according to the account of Singapore’s statement. The corporate investigation and the espionage allegation therefore should not be treated as a single established case.

US Bureau of Industry and Security guidance explains licensing requirements for covered exports to restricted-headquartered entities overseas and includes a qualification for compliant data-center operators. Source: US Bureau of Industry and Security.

The contracts and controls that still need scrutiny

The investment report describes Chinese companies’ overseas capacity leasing as legal, but its blanket description of restrictions on owning the processors requires qualification. The US Bureau of Industry and Security, the Commerce Department agency issuing the export guidance, set out a licensing requirement in its May 31, 2026 guidance: exports of covered advanced computing items to entities headquartered in restricted jurisdictions, or with an ultimate parent headquartered there, require a licence even when the recipient is located elsewhere, unless an applicable exception is available.

The guidance says that requirement dates to November 2023 and remained enforceable despite BIS’s May 2025 decision not to enforce the AI Diffusion Rule’s new compliance requirements. It also says bona fide data centre operators otherwise complying with export regulations need not cease ongoing use, storage, disposal or servicing of the equipment because of the guidance, until further notice. The account of the rules describes their application to Chinese-headquartered companies and their overseas subsidiaries. A data centre’s overseas location alone does not settle the export-control question.

Three Republican House committee chairmen have requested a closed-door briefing with Jensen Huang for November 18 about his interactions with Alice Huang and Nvidia’s protections against foreign espionage, according to the account of the company’s response. They asked him to accept that date or propose an alternative by November 11; the request does not confirm a briefing will occur.

For the investment proposal, the missing evidence is whether investors committed money, who would own and control the processors, and what supply and customer contracts were executed. Nvidia’s inquiry must separately address whether the alleged personal relationship exposed company information or affected decisions. The reported business ties identify transactions and relationships to examine; they do not by themselves prove espionage or unlawful chip transfers.